U.S. Aggression in the Western Hemisphere — and What Congress Can Do About It
Updated February 11, 2026
Author: Mariam Malik, Senior Foreign Policy Associate
INTRODUCTION
In recent weeks, following military intervention in Venezuela that violated U.S. and international law, the Trump Administration has escalated its rhetoric and actions against certain countries and territories in the Western Hemisphere. This explainer analyzes the roles of resource exploitation, corporate profit, and other factors in the Trump Administration’s aggression toward Venezuela, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, and Greenland, and how Congress can respond. This explainer is not a comprehensive summary of the administration’s military aggression; President Trump has also threatened or taken military action in Iran, Nicaragua, Somalia, Syria, Gaza, Panama, and more.
Venezuela
The U.S. has a long history of using sanctions, covert operations, and military intervention to topple sovereign governments—democratic and authoritarian alike—in Latin America. While the U.S. has maintained sanctions on Venezuela in some form since 2005, the first Trump administration imposed draconian, broad-based economic sanctions beginning in 2017. These greatly exacerbated Venezuela’s economic crisis and made it difficult for Venezuela to import basic human needs like food and medicine, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths.
In violation of both U.S. and international law, the Trump Administration carried out the latest act of aggression on January 3, 2026, conducting airstrikes on military bases and damaging civilian areas in Caracas. These airstrikes reportedly killed at least 100 people, including 32 Cubans. The real death toll could be much higher. The attack followed 33 unconstitutional and illegal strikes on boats in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific that killed 115 people. These unlawful and immoral strikes have continued into 2026.
In the same January 3 operation, the U.S. military abducted President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, and illegally brought them to New York City, where Maduro was indicted for alleged drug trafficking.
The Trump Administration has made clear that a desire to control oil, and boosting oil companies’ profits, motivated this regime change operation. President Trump has accused Venezuela of “stealing” American oil, suggesting that the U.S. and U.S.-based corporations are entitled to these resources, not Venezuela. Most U.S. oil companies, however, remain reluctant to make major investments in Venezuela’s oil sector given the high levels of perceived risk, which stem in part from U.S. sanctions that remain in place, as well as the high cost of extraction of Venezuela’s mostly heavy crude oil. The Trump Administration has eased some sanctions—however, the U.S. naval blockade, and control of Venezuela’s exports, remain in place, contributing to uncertainty for oil companies.
After Venezuela’s Vice President, Delcy Rodriguez, took over as president, Trump threatened Rodriguez and Venezuela’s security chief, Diasdado Cabello, demanding U.S. companies’ “total access” to Venezuela’s oil. Rodriguez has promised to work with the U.S. Trump also claimed the U.S. would “run” Venezuela for years—a clear violation of international law that denies the Venezuelan people their right to self-determination. Additionally, the CIA began growing its presence in Venezuela, presumably to ensure the country complies with U.S. corporate interests. Furthermore, lawmakers in Venezuela voted to change oil industry regulations, giving foreign oil companies more control and limiting their tax liability.
The Trump Administration has since announced various oil deals, including one giving the U.S. control over the sale of and disbursement of proceeds from Venezuela’s oil. These proceeds are being deposited into a U.S.-controlled bank account in Qatar, raising accountability and constitutional concerns.
Beyond oil, Venezuela also has a large gold reserve and other minerals that U.S. corporations could profit from; these resources may influence U.S. foreign policy in Venezuela in the future.
Colombia
President Trump has clashed with Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro, who has fiercely criticized Trump and U.S. imperialism. Petro refused to accept U.S. deportation flights, criticized Trump’s attacks on boats in the Caribbean, and suspended intelligence sharing. Trump threatened and sanctioned Petro in response. In September 2025, the Trump Administration revoked Petro’s visa after he appealed to U.S. servicemembers to defy President Trump’s immoral and unlawful orders. Petro also strongly criticized Trump’s actions in Venezuela.
On February 5, 2026, Petro and Trump met in the White House. Petro was given a temporary visa for this visit. Both leaders positively discussed the need for their countries to work together. Given their past tensions and Trump’s militant posture in the region, it remains to be seen if this meeting will prevent future acts of U.S. aggression against Colombia.
Cuba
For 60 years, the U.S. has deliberately stifled Cuba’s economy through an illegal embargo and other sanctions—referred to by many as a blockade for their extraterritorial impacts—that have denied Cubans basic human needs, such as food, fuel, and medicine, and led to outbreaks of preventable diseases. In just one year, U.S. sanctions cost Cuba $7.5 billion according to the Cuban government. President Obama’s policy of normalization with Cuba provided a measure of sanctions relief. President Trump then reversed Obama’s policy and increased the U.S. embargo to an unprecedented level. President Biden retained Trump’s Cuba policy before lifting some sanctions in his term’s final days—only for Trump to reinstate them days later.
Cuba used to import one third of its oil from Venezuela—the same oil President Trump and oil companies want to control. In 2025, Mexico overtook Venezuela to become Cuba’s largest oil supplier. The Trump Administration reportedly considered a naval blockade to halt Cuba’s oil imports, but is now enforcing this blockade through tariffs. President Trump imposed these tariffs via a national emergency declaration rather than an act of Congress—a clear abuse of the president’s emergency powers. This blockade has pushed Cuba’s already crisis-wracked economy into free-fall. As of January 30, experts estimate that Cuba’s oil supply will run out in mid-late February.
In the wake of Maduro’s ouster, President Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have repeatedly threatened forceful intervention in Cuba. President Trump also suggested that U.S. military intervention in Cuba might not be necessary to topple the Cuban government, because Cuba could “fall” without Venezuela’s oil. In practice, this means intentionally worsening the Cuban people’s suffering, through economic pressure, with the goal of instigating the overthrow of Cuba’s government.
Mexico
President Trump has criticized Mexico’s President, Claudia Sheinbaum, for her administration’s leftist policies that include accessible childcare, affordable housing, and making healthcare a constitutional right. Trump has also used anti-drug trafficking rhetoric against Mexico to manufacture consent for potential U.S. military escalation. While some drugs do enter the U.S. from Mexico, the U.S. and Mexico cooperate on anti-drug trafficking initiatives. A U.S. attack could jeopardize these efforts.
Additionally, this year, the United-States Mexico and Canada Agreement (USMCA) is up for review, forcing a reevaluation of U.S.-Mexico trade policies. Historically, the U.S. has drafted trade deals that favor U.S. corporate profits, while exploiting the workers President Trump professes to champion in the U.S. and abroad. Just as with other Latin American countries, Trump’s threats could be designed to bully Mexico and encourage compliance with U.S. corporate interests.
Greenland
The Trump Administration’s interest in Greenland lies with the country's raw minerals, shipping routes, and strategic position allowing access to the Arctic. Greenland sits between the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK Gap), a valuable location to monitor submarine, air, and naval traffic and mount missile defenses. NATO currently tracks Russian naval movements in the GIUK Gap, as does the U.S. via its Pituffik Space Base. This major airbase in Greenland supports missile tracking, early warning defense systems, and space surveillance. Control of Greenland would allow the U.S. military to expand the Pituffik Space Base.
Greenland is also home to natural resources such as oil, gas, uranium, and other critical resources that are becoming easier to access as climate change worsens. These resources are important to weapons manufacturers, technology companies, and other corporations. Additionally, climate change is melting Arctic ice, potentially opening new shipping routes.
Though military action is being put off by discussions between NATO and the Trump Administration, NATO is not in a position to negotiate on behalf of Greenlanders.
Congress’ Role in Preventing Unauthorized Military Action
Congress has a few tools available to prevent military action and respond to unauthorized military action by the executive branch.
Amendments to Block Funding for the Use of Military Force
Members of Congress may attach amendments to must-pass legislation to block funding for the use of military force in or against a country or territory without authorization, or to affirm that existing laws do not provide authority for the use of force.
Historically, Members attempted to create these guardrails via the annual appropriations bills or the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which sets policies for the Defense Department. This year, Sen. Chris Murphy (D-CT) and others have voiced support for using the appropriations process to block funds for war with Venezuela.
If, however, congressional leaders oppose such guardrails, they may thwart those efforts as they have previously done. For example:
In 2019, Reps. Ro Khanna (D-CA-17) and Matt Gaetz (R-FL-01) offered an amendment to H.R. 2500, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 NDAA to bar the use of funds for war with Iran without congressional authorization. While the Democratically-controlled House approved the amendment, it was removed from the final version of the NDAA during conference negotiations with the GOP-controlled Senate (with input from President Trump). The Senate NDAA did not include this provision.
In 2025, Reps. Thomas Massie (R-KY-04), Lateefah Simon (D-CA-12), and Rashida Tlaib (D-MI-12), respectively, proposed amendments to H.R. 4016, the FY 2026 Defense appropriations bill to prevent funds from being used for military force against Iran in contravention of the War Powers Resolution. The Republican-controlled House Rules Committee did not permit votes on these amendments.
The War Powers Resolution
Under Article I of the Constitution, only Congress has the power to declare war and authorize the use of U.S. armed forces in armed conflict. However, presidents have increasingly sidestepped this constitutional requirement and conducted military operations without congressional approval.
To address this overreach, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution (WPR) in 1973. Section 5(c) of the WPR allows Congress to pass a resolution directing the president to immediately remove U.S. forces from “hostilities” that have not been authorized by Congress. The word “hostilities” was deliberately used to permit Congress to prohibit actions falling short of war, including, “a state of confrontation in which no shots have been fired but where there is a clear and present danger of armed conflict.”
Since Fall 2025, Congress voted on numerous WPRs related to Venezuela and attacks on boats in international waters:
On October 8, 2025, the Senate voted on Sens. Tim Kaine (D-VA) and Adam Schiff’s (D-CA) WPR to end hostilities against entities the President designated as terrorists or the states in which they operate without Congress’ explicit authorization. It failed 51-48.
On November 5, 2025, the Senate voted on Sens. Tim Kaine (D-VA), Adam Schiff (D-CA), and Rand Paul’s (R-KY) WPR that would remove U.S. forces from hostilities against Venezuela. It failed 51-49.
On December 17, 2025 the House voted on two WPRs:
On January 8, 2026 the Senate voted to advance a WPR introduced by Sen. Tim Kaine (D-VA) that would remove armed forces from hostilities within or against Venezuela. It passed 52-47.
On January 14, 2026 the Senate voted again on Sen. Kaine’s WPR above, this time on a procedural motion introduced by Senate Republicans to defeat the WPR. The procedural motion passed 51-50, meaning the WPR was defeated. Vice President J.D. Vance cast the tie-breaking vote.
On January 22, 2026, the House voted on Rep. Jim McGovern’s (D-MA-02) WPR to remove U.S. armed forces from Venezuela. It failed 215-215. A tie vote in the House means the measure is defeated.
Legislation to Block Funding for War, the Use of Military Force, and After-Action
Congress can introduce standalone bills to prevent the use of the military force. For example, Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-OR) introduced a bill prohibiting unauthorized military action in Venezuela, and Rep. Seth Moulton (D-MA-06) introduced a bill to prevent federal funds from being used for a military operation in Venezuela that Congress has not authorized.
Congress may also legislate to avoid certain outcomes in the aftermath of military action. For example, Rep. Mike Levin (D-CA-49) and Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-OR) introduced a bill to prevent tax dollars from being sent to oil companies to build their infrastructure in Venezuela.
Approving or rejecting supplemental appropriations requests
The President may ask Congress for extra funding to support military operations, as presidents did throughout the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These requests may be tied to the regular appropriations process and attached to moving spending bills. Congress may alternatively consider supplementals independently, as it did in March 2020 to provide extra funding for the COVID-19 response. These supplemental measures offer another opportunity for Members who oppose military operations, as Members may vote against extra funds and, in sufficient numbers, deny the President the resources he seeks.
Additional Tools Beyond Blocking Military Action
Beyond authorizing or blocking military action, Congress can also rein in other forms of egregious U.S. aggression. For example, last year, Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) introduced a bill that would lift the embargo on Cuba and normalize trade relations.
Congress can also rein in the executive’s use of emergency declarations. For example, in 2020, Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-MN-05) introduced the Congressional Oversight of Sanctions Act to terminate any emergency declaration by the president within 60 days unless Congress extends it, while exempting basic human needs like medicine and clean water from sanctions.
We Build Progress thanks the Center for Economic and Policy Research and the Friends Committee on National Legislation for their comments and insights, which contributed to this explainer